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FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY: THE
JUVENILE COURT AND THE DECLINE OF
THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
Samuel M. Davis*
THE BEST-LAID
EXPERIMENT. By Ellen
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Ryerson. New York: Hill and Wang. 1978.

Pp. 180. $9.95.
There have been three great moments in the development of
the juvenile court as an institution. The first was the creation of
the country's first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899.
The second was the Supreme Court's momentous 1967 decision
in In re Gault, 1 which precipitated a vast outpouring of decisions
by lower, mostly state, courts, expanding the meaning and application of Gault far beyond its specific holding. In Gault the Court
held that young people are entitled to many of the same rights
in juvenile court proceedings that adults enjoy in the criminal
court, including the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel. Viewing
Gault as a kind of shooting star, lower courts followed its spirit
more than its letter, bringing about a significant transformation
of the juvenile court in accordance with constitutional due process requirements.
The third watershed of the juvenile court's development is
taking place now, barely eleven years after Gault. Ironically, it is
the result of dissatisfaction with what the juvenile court has become. The current movement is challenging some of the fundamental notions on which the juvenile court has been based, e.g.,
that the court ought to exercise very broad jurisdiction over all
kinds of youthful misconduct, including truancy, disobedience to
parents, and running away from home, and that the judge ought
to possess very broad discretionto fashion an appropriate disposition to meet the needs of the individual child. The rather profound changes urged in the proposed Juvenile Justice Standards,
most of which have now been approved by the American Bar
Association, are an example of this new movement in the juvenile
court's development. The Standards propose, inter alia, to elimi* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1966, University of Southern Mississippi; J.D. 1969, University of Mississippi; L.L.M. 1970, University of Virginia.-Ed,
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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nate so-called "status offenses" from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and to abandon the rehabilitative ideal in favor of the
principle of proportionality-definite "punishments" to fit the
wrong committed.
Ellen Ryerson's new book spans all of these developments in
her attempt to fathom the juvenile court's origins and to explain
the loss of faith in its effectiveness as an institution. Her focus is
on intellectual history, not social history, in that she is concerned
with ideas more than with people. The subject lends itself particularly well to a humanistic approach, and professionals in the
fields of history, law, psychiatry, and sociology will find The BestLaid Plans a significant and valuable addition to the literature
on the juvenile court.
In the introduction, Ryerson modestly acknowledges that
"[o]ne asks for trouble by suggesting that an institution bears
the imprint of a certain period . . . ." Yet she accomplishes this
task with consummate skill. In its historical and sociological context the .juvenile court as an institution was just as surely ah
outgrowth of the progressive movement as in its legal context it
was a product of the social jurisprudence movement. Ryerson
does not simply begin, however, with the creation of the juvenile
court by turn-of-the-century reformers; rather, she reaches back
into the early nineteenth century to discover antecedents of the
concept of specialized treatment for children. Moreover, she analyzes the changes since the progressive era in psychiatry, sociology, and law that, along with the contrast between rhetoric and
reality, have contributed to the failure of the juvenile court.
She undoubtedly was aided in her task by the publication of
earlier works that examined the same subject: Anthony Platt's
The Child Savers (1969); Sanford Fox's 1970 Stanford Law
Review article, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective; and Robert Mennel's Origins of the Juvenile Court:
Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile
Delinquents (published in a 1972 issue of Crime and
Delinquency). Platt's and Fox's works in particular are
"revisionist" accounts of the motivations that led to the creation
of the juvenile court. They argue that the founders of the juvenile
court were less concerned with the plight of children than with
preserving traditional values against the rising tides of urbanism
and industrialism that threatened to destroy those values.
Ryerson augments her credibility by resisting jumping on the
revisionist bandwagon. To be sure, she acknowledges the enormous scope of urbanism, industrialism, and population growth
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and their impact on American life and thought, and she recognizes the threat these powerful forces posed to the romantic view
of American life as rural, morally correct, and simple. But she is
reluctant to consider this as direct evidence that the motives of
reformers were other than humane.
No one can fault the reformers for a lack of zeal or faith that
their new creation would work. But their faith may have been
misplaced because of the profound departure from existing practice that the juvenile court represented. It was envisioned more
as a social agency than a court, leading Ryerson to comment:
"Juvenile courts, unfettered by the rules of criminal procedure,
took delinquency out of the adversary process much as other progressive reforms took issues out of the contentious, unpredictable
world of electoral politics."
Yet it was this conceptual difference that probably accounted for much of the critical perception of the juvenile court
as a social institution attempting to deal with the serious problem
of crime. The criticism, in brief, was that as a social institution
deployed to combat crime, the juvenile court was in over its head
and poorly equipped to deal with the problem. In 1926, for example, John H. Wigmore, the great evidence scholar, wrote:
We recognize the beneficent function of the juvenile court. We
have always supported it, and we are proud that Illinois invented
it. But its devoted advocates, in their zeal, have lost their balance.
And, as usual in other fields of science that have been awakening
to their interest in the crime problem, their error is due to their
narrow and imperfect conception of the criminal law. They are new
to it, hence their inability to understand it. The criminal law does
three things, two of which it does alone. (1) It pronounces and
reaffirms the moral law. (2) It threatens other possible offenders,
so as to deter them from offenses. (3) It handles this individual
offender, now caught, so as to prevent repetition by him.
Now the third of these things is the affair of the penal administrative branch of the state. . . . Ever since Raymond Saleilles, the
Paris professor of law, thirty years ago published his book on "The
Individualization of Punishment," that principle has found wider
and wider recognition. But in many quarters it has come to be
regarded as the only principle of criminal law; and that is where
the social workers and the psychiatrists are going wrong. They are
ignoring the other two functions of the criminal law, and they are
virtually on the way to abolish criminal law and undermine social
morality, by ignoring those other two functions . . . . The courtroom is the only place in the community today where the moral
law is laid down to the people with the voice of authority. The
churches do not do it. The clubs do not do it. Public opinion has
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no concrete and authoritative organ. The court alone does it,
through the criminal code.
But the social woi;kers and the psychologists and the psychiatrists know nothing of crime or wrong. They refer to "reactions"
and "maladjustments" and "complexes." Look at that definition
of crime, _quoted from a society for hygiene, on p. 311 of volume
XVI of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; crime, we
learn, is "merely a pattern-shift, and one always highly potential,
in the kaleidoscope of broad individuo-social handicap, hardship,
and maladjustment. . . ."
The people need to have the moral law dinned into their consciences every day in the year. The juvenile court does not do that.
And to segregate a large share of daily crime into the juvenile court
is to take a long step toward undermining the whole criminal law. 2

To a limited extent, as a result of the Gault decision, tlie
adversary process has returned to the juvenile court. Lawyers,
who had been supplanted by social workers, psychologists, and
psychiatrists, in turn have replaced the social scientists. But
these reforms were instituted not as a protection for society, not
as an answer to Wigmore's concerns, but rather as a protection
for juveniles whose rights had too often been arbitrarily trampled.
Thus Ryerson observes: "However intent reformers were upon the
social or therapeutic nature of the juvenile court, and however
successful in expunging from its language the vocabulary of criminal law, the juvenile court was and is a legal institution."
Even when viewed as a legal institution the juvenile court
has met with harsh criticism for becoming too much like its criminal counterpart. Dissenting in the Gault case, Justice Stewart
said:
The inflexible restrictions that the Constitution so wisely
made applicable to adversary criminal trials have no inevitable
place in the proceedings of those public social agencies known as
juvenile or family courts. And to impose the Court's long catalog
of requirements upon juvenile proceedings in every area of the
country is to invite a long step backwards into the nineteenth
century. In that era there were no juvenile proceedings, and a child
was tried in a conventional criminal court with all the trappings
of a conventional criminal trial. So it was that a 12-year-old boy
named James Guild was tried in New Jersey for killing Catharine
Beakes. A jury found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced
to death by hanging. The sentence was executed. It was all very
constitutional. 3
2. Wigmore, Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1926).
3. 387 U.S. at 79-80 (footnote omitted).

916

Michigan Law Review

LVol. 77:912

Perhaps one reason for the failure of the juvenile court to
reach the lofty heights anticipated by its founders, and one which
might explain Justice Stewart's lament, is that simply too much
was expected of it, which is so often the pitfall of reform efforts.
One need only look at the statements of some of the persons
prominent in the creation and management of the court to appreciate this suggestion. For example, Ryerson quotes one reformer
who believed: ~'There is such a thing as an instantaneous awakening of the soul to the realization of higher and better things by
the magnetic influence of one soul reacting upon another." Another commented: "There is no more potent influence over a boy
than a good man or woman . . . . The way to make a good boy
is to rub him against a good man." Such boundless faith in the
rehabilitative ideal! It is no wonder that it was doomed, if not to
failure, then to disappointing abstraction.
It is precisely in the area of the reformers' extraordinary idealism and faith in the regenerative potential of the juvenile court
that Ryerson reveals great insight. As we look back over the enormous changes that have taken place in the present century, the
reformers seem to take on an almost two-dimensional quality.
More important, their statements appear so out of focus with
reality, albeit perhaps only because viewed by us from afar, that
they seem to have viewed the subjects of their own concern-the
children-as being two-dimensional themselves.
Disillusionment over what the juvenile court has become
unquestionably exists, but Ryerson is not overly pessimistic. She
predicts, safely, that the juvenile court will continue to exist in
some form, if for no other reasons than that it seems to do no
harm to treat children separately from adults and that we do not
hastily discard old ways of dealing with social problems. She
ends on an almost positive note: "Due process thinking and more
modest ambitions may help us stage a not too undignified retreat. We need not be too gloomy about the retreat: if experience
dictates that we aim to do less with law, there is at least the possible satisfaction of doing it more frankly and fairly." A juvenile
court with limited rehabilitative goals and with procedural safeguards to protect the rights of youthful offenders would seem
most likely to fulfill the ideal of fairness without the danger of
inflating expectations.

